rejecting not only a partnership with the Czechs, but also the Czech preference for rapid transition to a market orientation.
2 Before and after the opening of the reform era, the Slovaks were substantially less comfortable with departure from the order and security of Soviet ways than the Czechs.
Nevertheless, the Slovak self-government and fiscal systems today still closely resemble those developed jointly with the Czechs in the twilight of the Czechoslovakian era. However, the Slovaks have clearly defined the geography of regions (oblasty), laying the groundwork for a system that could alter the existing two-tier governmental landscape consisting of the central government and the municipalities.
Reemergence of Local Governments
Following the Velvet Revolution, the desire to establish local governments was strong in Slovakia. Under socialist rule, from 1950 until 1989, the autonomy of local governments had largely been lost as decisions about the quality and types of public services were directed by the central government based in Prague. Regional governments did exist, but their role was merely to administer and facilitate central government policies.
The autonomy of local government was further compromised by intergovernmental finance. Virtually all revenues for local government operations were funneled through the central government, and local governments had little leeway in the provision of public services. There was a sense that funding decisions were based on political and party influence and had a limited relationship to needs or demands, especially capital expenditures. Many of the functions normally provided at the local level were provided by the central government, for example, police, public utilities, fire protection, education, housing, and medical care.
Under central planning local governments became almost moribund, a situation that ran counter to the Slovak tradition. The new freedom that arrived in 1989 allowed the reemergence of local governments, and there are currently 2,781 municipalities in Slovakia. A few cities have populations over 50,000, and the capital city of Bratislava has a population of 452,000. Most of the cities have fewer than 500 inhabitants, and many have fewer than 100. A comparison of nine Central and Eastern European countries reveals that Slovakia and the Czech Republic have significantly more cities per 10,000 citizens than any of their neighbors (table 5.1). The country that comes closest is Hungary, which shares many traditions with its neighbors.
The number and the limited size of Slovakia's cities and towns raise the question of whether there is an excessive number of small governments given the personnel and resource limitations for the administration of such small municipalities. Several supportive organizations have emerged to facilitate the development of a core of professional local public managers. About 125 cities have created the position of city manager, similar to that in American cities, except that Slovak elected officials also play an important role in the day-to-day operations of the city. The Slovak Republic also has an organization of city finance directors, which operates much like the Government Finance Officers Association in the United States.
3 Local governments have also formed the 2. Valko (1997, pp. 76 and 77) notes that the new Slovak constitution "establishes the possibility to stop . . . the process of privatization and/or restrict business activities and to reverse various measures that already had been taken in this respect." Again, "efforts were made to slow down economic reform and to reinstate state control over the economy or its disposition." 3. The two groups conduct regular meetings for training and professional development. They are active in the development of policy relative to their financial relationship to the central government and the proper level of government for the provision of services. The emergence and the focus of these two groups appear to be a direct result of the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Bratislava, which adopted the policy of building administrative infrastructure in local governments in Slovakia and has conducted regular workshops on personnel and financial issues germane to the management of local governments in countries in transition.
Organization of Cities and Towns of Slovakia, which represents about 90 percent of all the municipalities in dealings with the central government.
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State of the Slovak Economy
Slovak economic development has been surprisingly strong, especially considering the political environment and the demanding requirements of the transformation process. As a result, citizens should expect a gradual growth not only in private sector welfare, but also in the volume and quality of public goods and services at the national and local levels.
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Slovakia adopted, at first under Czech tutelage, the standard strategies of price liberalization, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and the liberalization of foreign trade. Following the liberation from central planning, signs of economic progress began with growth in construction, increased domestic demand, and greater export productivity. As development progressed, government, household, and gross fixed capital investment spending also increased. Within five years, 95 percent of prices were unregulated, the most notable exception being rent control in housing. The expected explosive inflationary effects of these actions were successfully countered by the National Bank of Slovakia's restrictive monetary policy. Slovaks argue that their fiscal management performance was not surpassed by any other transitional state.
These initial economic successes were due in large measure to a mini-boom in exports. Prosperity and expansion in western markets provided demand, and the shift was made from old Council for Mutual Economic Assistance markets to the European Union markets that are so important. The Slovak Republic's ratio of exports to gross domestic product (GDP) was roughly 65 percent in 1995 (OECD 1996, p. 115) , and the mix of exports was showing a tendency to reflect 4. The organization has been active in drafting and reviewing legislation on public administration and public policy issues for subnational governments. An important issue it and the central government have been struggling with is the assignment of responsibilities for public services between these two bodies of government. The organization has also organized a foundation to train city employees in all areas of local government responsibilities in Slovakia.
5. Slovakia's people are not happy with the sacrifices implied by the pursuit of transformation objectives. In 1993 a U.S. Information Agency opinion poll showed 47 percent of Slovaks preferring the current system to the previous communist one; 42 percent said it was worse. No less than 72 percent agreed that democracy did not fulfill their expectations, only 23 percent said it did. The economic situation in 1993 seemed better than under socialism for 22 percent, but it was deemed worse by 71 percent. Finally, 39 percent preferred private rather than state control of business, 53 percent favored state control (Marcincïn 1996, p. 11 ). 
Privatization
Potential Benefits
Privatization today does not seem as promising for transitional economies as it did at the outset. However, it has signaled the emergence of property ownership and guaranteed the "irreversibility of the political changes carried out after the year 1989" (Mikloš and Zitnänský 1997, p. 88) , and it has provided newly restructured firms with some insulation from state intervention. Early in the transformation process, the hope was that privatization would transfer lowproductivity properties from the state's financial and managerial burdens to the lists of higher productivity taxable properties. Privatization was to grow the private sector and return economic competitiveness to Slovakia. The theory remains fine, but practice in the former Czechoslovakia and elsewhere suggests that endogenous growth through the development of small start-up firms is far more promising.
Privatization can promote fiscal decentralization by contributing to the revenues of Slovak municipalities as larger private sector holdings increase the base of the property tax. Unfortunately, the current privatization achievement is probably not an important factor in the generation of local government revenues, because the property tax is rather inconsequential in terms of its yield.
History
Slovak privatization initially paralleled that of the Czechs, and can be viewed positively. A first round of small-scale privatization in 1992 auctioned off smaller production plants, retail stores, restaurants, and so on, and a second round permitted foreign buyers to bid for previously unsold properties. A first wave of large-scale privatization from 1991-93 focused on the denationalization of small-scale firms from retail and the trade services branches, as well as some dwellings. A total of 678 Slovakian state enterprises were sold for revenues of Sk 169 billion (Mikloš and Zitnänský 1997, p. 88) . The denationalization of more large-scale industry, construction, agriculture, transportation, health care, financial institutions, and so on was the intent of a second wave of voucher privatization, initiated in September 1993.
The voucher method permitted, for a nominal sum, the participation of all interested citizens. Each could purchase coupon booklets for investment privatization funds for a direct claim on that national wealth that was to be privatized or let their points be used by private agents. In September 1993 state bonds replaced the voucher system, slowing and changing privatization dramatically. The bond compensation program provided each registered citizen with a bond for Sk 10,000 maturing in five years. The bonds could be traded for shares sold by the privatization agency or used toward the purchase of individual apartments (Mikloš 1997a, p. 108) .
From 1994 through 1996, privatized properties went from just under 29 percent to about 50 percent of formerly state-owned property. 6 In numerous cases, direct sales of national property 6. In 1994 and 1995, 17 percent of state-owned property was privatized by the "standard method" of direct sales, bringing the overall share of privatized industrial properties to 45 percent of the total (Mikloš 1995, p. 11) . In 1996 approximately 400 direct sales were made at a price of Sk 18 billion (Frensch 1997, p. 21) , or roughly another 5 percent of total industrial properties privatized with the total task about 50 percent completed.
were in the form of management buyouts, with the sales being made "exclusively to individuals and companies close to or recommended by government coalition party structures" (Frensch 1997, p. 91) . It has been estimated that the Sk 18 billion revenues on 1996 sales had a book value of around Sk 50 billion (Frensch 1997, p. 21) . At such prices the sale of large volumes of property should have been simple.
7
The extent of privatization is also indicated by the share of GDP produced by the private sector (table 5. 2). By the end of 1996, that share in industry was 68.2 percent (an increase in that year of 3.6 percent); construction, 83.2 percent (1.4 percent increase); retail sales, 94.6 percent (2.9 percent increase); transport, 82 percent (19.9 percent increase); and agriculture, 86.1 percent (4.3 percent increase) (Marcincïn 1996, p. 130) .
Substantive complaints about the government's privatization policies have included the following issues:
• The process is nontransparent. The media, the public, and the political opposition are not permitted to scrutinize the government's privatization actions.
• State-owned property sales have almost always excluded foreign buyers. 8 A relatively large number of enterprises designated as being of "strategic importance" is withheld from privatization altogether.
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• The coalition government's privatization process has not restructured industries. Monopoly positions held under the previous regime have been retained (Marcincïn 1996, p. 24) , which will likely preserve soft budgetary constraints even in privatized firms. 10 Some of the actions undertaken by the National Property Fund have been illegal. In some instances, transactions were closed before the property in question was in the possession of the privatization agency. Thus, according to Kolaríková (1995, p. 13) , the agency "was dealing with somebody else's property."
7. The National Property Fund sells assets at prices significantly below book values; it does not issue any information about competing projects or the relevant sales criteria. The first installments have usually been only about 20 percent of the negotiated sales price. Generally, as much as 50 percent of the payments of the purchase price have been forgiven if the purchaser declared himself or herself ready to use that monetary equivalent for investment purposes. "In the case of Slovnaft, when 39% of shares was sold, 84% of the sale price was later forgiven" (Marcincïn 1996, pp. 12-13) . Furthermore, "Very controversial was an amendment to the Income Tax Law, approved in late March 1996, which freed new owners of privatized companies from paying taxes on income resulting from an NPF decision to lower the purchase price of the property. Although a forgiven payment is considered an income, the law exempts new owners from paying tax on such income if the remaining money is used for investment purposes."
8. Slovakia has an apparent preference for domestic sales and intimidates foreign buyers. "The IMF, concluding a study in October, 1996, . . . commented on the SR's incompletely transparent privatization methodology as follows: such privatization must have more apparent effects on the trust of the public or have more negative consequences. Fogginess of the process repels potential foreign investors from entering into the process in the same measure as in other transforming states in central Europe" (Mikloš 1997, p. 136) .
9. Twenty-seven companies are specified in energy, the gas industry, the postal service, telecommunications, armaments, pharmaceuticals, machinery, agriculture, forestry, and water resources. Forty additional companies will be subject to privatization, but the state has assured the preservation of its right to influence them. "The state maintains a 'so-called golden share' (a share with special rights) in those jointstock companies, where the majority stake has already been privatized" (Mikloš 1997, p. 111) . According to Mikloš, a former privatization minister, this golden share contradicts a constitutional principle of equality among various forms of ownership. Furthermore, it was to be implemented retroactively in firms previously privatized.
10. Mikloš (1997a, p. 25) sees the ongoing ownership of the National Property Fund of significant shares of large Slovak firms as a rather ominous situation, making it likely that two parallel "private" sectors exist in Slovakia today: "One, characterized by large monopolies, supports government, cooperates with it and affects legislation and state economic policy, by which it ensures its particular position, while the second private sector is characterized by small enterprises, without protection from state officers and monopolies."
• The privatization agency will almost certainly not have the funds to honor the privatization bonds (whose market prices have come to reflect that expectation) when they come to maturity (Vaskovic¨ 1995, p. 4) , although the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1996, p. 66) has more positive expectations.
• Numerous property sales have been made opportunistically, to enrich private parties of interest to the governing coalition or to reward parties loyal to the coalition.
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Privatization and Aggregate Economic Performance
Slovak economic performance would have been even better had politics and privatization contributed in a more positive way. Because privatization has favored insiders and political supporters, it has deflected potential foreign investors, who face selling prices far closer to market values. Where such investments are undertaken, there is presumably a lag time between contracting and experiencing the full productivity-enhancing effects. Therefore, to the extent that other countries are more successful in attracting such investments, the difference in growth rates, observed only with the time lag mentioned, will be more apparent in the future. The state has retained indirect but significant influence on industry through state-owned banks, essentially permitting industry to continue the soft budget constraints of the previous era through bank credit and collections policies. Financially supporting industry through liberal credit policies keeps marginal firms functioning and prevents a politically undesirable swelling of unemployment rolls. Therefore, the state has not been anxious to privatize the banks, despite pressures to do so.
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The persistence of privatization problems, the slowing of the process, and the related slow progress toward effective industrial restructuring have several effects: retaining inflated stateowned, inefficient, and noncompetitive private industrial sectors; keeping state expenditures higher than they need to be; constraining productive performance; keeping tax revenues below the levels needed to meet local public service demands; and failing to promote local self-autonomy. Source: Marcincïn (1996, p. 25). 11. Marcincïn and others have documented this assertion at length. He explains why an opinion poll published in 1995 found that "only 14% believed that the current coalition changed its privatization program for reasons other than strengthening its political power" (Marcincïn 1996, p. 17) .
12. It was widely reported during the political crisis of late 1997 that an important element of Czech reform inadequacy was the inappropriate retention of state influence on the private sector. Through the state-owned banks, firms could be encouraged, through state moral suasion and lending policy not to downsize their work force. In the seven years since the Velvet Revolution, the legacy of labor hoarding from the previous planning regime has still not been overcome. The same can be said for the Slovak economy.
Privatization, Markets, and Real Estate Values
This privatization situation affects, among other things, industrial development, the fiscal development of local governments, the property tax, and the development of the real estate market. We are particularly interested in the requirements for the establishment of a real estate market, which include the following elements (see Zapletalová 1997 for a somewhat different perspective):
• A banking system that has the capacity to fund real estate mortgages • The private ownership of property • An active real estate market in all the principal types of properties • The elimination of price controls in the housing market so that market forces establish values • The elimination of subsidies (such as for housing and utilities) that affect the real estate market.
Because these characteristics have not yet been created or achieved in Slovakia, current real estate prices cannot be said to reflect market forces or provide the basis for uniform taxation. The government is attempting to address some of these issues by raising housing rents by an additional 70 percent, liberalizing certain previously controlled prices on electricity and gas for residential and commercial customers, and increasing other fees and charges (EIU 1999) . These measures were adopted to counteract disappointing revenue yields, but their implementation will improve the conditions for market-based decisionmaking and market information.
Taxation in the Transition Period
Immediately after the Velvet Revolution, Czechoslovakia began to prepare for the adoption of a tax system that borrowed heavily from Western Europe. It was based on the kinds of taxes prevalent there without reference to whether such a system was truly optimal even for the countries using it, whether it could work well in the very different transitional economies, or whether the tax revenues would be sufficient for these countries.
The four most important governmental revenue sources in Slovakia are, therefore, the value added tax, personal income tax, corporate income tax, and an income tax on unincorporated businesses. Although these taxes are collected by the central government, all revenues except the value added tax are shared with local governments. These transfers are the primary revenue source of the local governments.
In the short period since the Velvet Divorce, Slovak legislation and policy pronouncements have emphasized a desire to achieve decentralization and to develop self-government for the municipalities. In practice, however, the Slovaks evince a stronger tendency to retain the old central planning ways than do the Czechs.
Taxes on Land and Buildings
The property tax in the Slovak system of local self-government remains a product of Czechoslovakian policy and legislative development. Although the tax systems of the twin republics have not diverged greatly, we expect that over time they will. In both republics property tax policy is established by the central government, but the day-to-day administration of the property tax is largely the domain of the municipalities, most of which are very small. Some of the small units in the Slovak Republic lack the personnel and other resources that would permit effective administration.
The taxation of land is based on the area of each individual parcel, and the taxation of buildings is based on the number of square meters of a structure's floor space, including the land area under the buildings. The tax rates for land and buildings have been established separately. Adjustments in the property tax formula account for the location of land and buildings and for the utilization of the taxed unit. These piecemeal efforts to approximate a property's actual value for tax purposes represent a limited substitute for market valuation. Slovak officials have begun to give some consideration to the adoption of a value-based system of taxation, but a number of obstacles must be overcome before adoption of an ad valorem system. Data on per capita land and building taxes show a significant pattern of revenue generation in the Slovak municipalities (figure 5.1). As the size of the municipality increases, per capita revenues from the tax on land decline, but the opposite situation is evident for tax on buildings. The implication is that the land tax, which is applied to a resource that cannot be removed from the region to avoid the tax, is underutilized in the cities, badly reducing needed revenues to levels below their potential.
Exemptions
Property tax law grants explicit exemptions for state-owned, cultural, religious, and other such properties. An individual owner of commercial real estate is taxed at a rate of about one-third of the rate applied to commercial organizations. All property owners applying for exemption must complete a form annually for each eligible parcel. In the larger cities, these exemptions represent a substantial portion of the potential property tax base. The transitional countries generally tend to pursue exemption policies that severely limit the revenue-generating capacity of the tax system (Holzman 1992, p. 242 ). 
Per capita Sk
Presumably to promote private housing construction, explicit 15-year exemptions are granted for newly constructed and recently renovated homes and to owners of restituted buildings. Because the current property tax base and rates do not produce a large yield, the incentive effect of this policy on the current tax level is not significant.
Residential property tax exemptions are granted to citizens who are at least 70 years old and to taxpayers able to convince the local government council that their property tax burden is excessive relative to their income. This form of tax relief appears to have little impact on the revenue yields from land and building taxes, except for the 12 percent exemption on land tax in the capital city of Bratislava (table 5. 3). It is likely that a larger measure of tax relief is enjoyed through simple tax evasion.
Intergovernmental Organization
Public administration includes both state administration and self-government. Subnational government officials can be engaged in both kinds of administration, because state administration includes service tasks delegated by the center to local units. Because many of the self-government and state administration services are performed by the same officers with the same equipment and materials, it would be impossible to isolate the costs of such services into local and central government components.
For the property tax in particular, policy and administration are split between the central and local governments. The central government controls property tax policy and law, establishes the base for land and for buildings, and sets the tax rates for each specific type of land and building. Local governments are responsible for the collection of property tax data and taxes. They must rely on the centrally operated cadastre for information pertaining to the ownership of properties.
Sources of Information
Information, including the square meter area of the land and buildings situated on it, is collected on forms designed by the central government and filled out by the taxpayer. The forms are accompanied by a readily understandable instruction book that contains both explanations and examples. The taxpayer submits the form to the municipality. About 40 percent of municipalities have no computers, so the data must be recorded by hand.
Specific information pertaining to land areas is available from the cadastre, but that institution provides limited help in identifying land ownership and no help in assessing the tax on buildings. The current quality of the cadastre is quite poor, especially in rural areas and smaller towns. Moreover, the information about taxable land and buildings received from taxpayers cannot be matched or verified against the cadastre. Despite this problem, the Ministry of Finance does not publicize any concerns that property tax compliance is a serious problem. However, any restructuring of the fiscal system to increase property tax yields substantially would doubtless have a negative impact on compliance. 
Taxable Base and Rates
Property taxation is not based on market-generated property prices, and land is treated separately from buildings. Land's taxable base depends on its area and use. There are 11 classifications of land, for 8 of which the assessed tax value adjusts for land quality, as estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture. For agricultural land the data collected on quality and potential productivity are remarkably detailed, and parcels in close proximity can have substantially different estimated productivity. There are six classes of buildings, ranging from residential housing to industrial buildings. The basic tax rate ranges from Sk 1 to Sk 10 per square meter, and increases by Sk 0.75 for each floor. The rates can be adjusted annually. The tax on buildings allows for two additional adjustments that allow city administrators a modest degree of flexibility in taxing differential qualities of location within their jurisdiction. First, data on the size and type of a building can be multiplied by a coefficient, which is determined by the population of the community where the building is located. The coefficient for the largest cities is greater than that for the smallest towns by a factor of 4.5. Second, the local administrator may apply a final coefficient to the formula reflecting the quality of the location of a taxable property within the city. The administrator can, therefore, increase the tax bill by an amount as large as 150 percent or reduce a tax bill by an amount up to -50 percent.
With an area-based tax, one would expect to find a close relationship between the area of the land or the building and the tax revenues produced. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 reveal that this is not the case in Slovakia. Certain classes of land are taxed far more heavily than others, for example, building plots in cities produce more revenue per square meter than arable land or forests. The same is true for the taxes on improvements.
Industrial and commercial buildings produce much greater revenues per square meter of area than do agricultural or apartment buildings. It appears that the heaviest tax burden is on commercial and industrial activities, or on capital. Casual observation suggests that smaller towns and cities are inclined to tax built plots more heavily than arable land; forests, perhaps seen as less productive of revenues than farmland, are subject to even less tax than farmland. Figure 5 .2 reviews the ratio of land tax levied to given areas of land by city size. In towns of up to 1,000 inhabitants, for example, the ratio of land tax levied on built plots is about eight times as high as that of arable land, and higher yet than of forests. The ratio declines inconsistently for large cities, being approximately two for Bratislava.
The ratio for arable land is more consistent and substantially lower, at around 1.25 for towns and smaller cities, though the ratio is only 0.14 in Bratislava. Figure 5 .3 illustrates why the smaller towns, for which the property tax is a unique source of independent revenue, tend to put the burden of tax revenues on buildings rather than on land.
Commercial and industrial buildings have consistently higher taxes than buildings for other uses. Apartments and agricultural buildings provided services and products, which were viewed as necessities of life in the communist era and were subsidized to keep their prices, and thus their taxes, very low. By contrast, industrial and commercial buildings were the sources of governmental revenue, and that tradition continues. Note, too, that the relatively greater importance of the property tax to municipalities is structured so that the ratio of tax to square meter of building space increases monotonically and significantly as the tax jurisdiction or municipality becomes smaller.
Tax Collection
The tax is collected from the property owner. In cases where ownership is uncertain, users of the property are responsible for the tax. Data obtained from the Ministry of Finance suggest the existence of a serious lag in the collection of the property tax, especially in the small communities where arrears may exceed 40 percent from land and approach 20 percent for the more heavily taxed buildings (table 5.4). The problem of uncollected property tax declines as the size of the city increases, although one would assume it to be unacceptably large from the standpoint of the revenue-hungry municipalities. In Bratislava, the reported number seems too low.
Appeal Procedures
Appealing a property or building tax assessment in Slovakia is attempted first through the local administrator. If denied, the taxpayer may appeal to the District Council and then to the Ministry of Finance, but only if new information has become available since the original appeal or if it is determined that information used in the original appeal was incorrect. All appeals and decisions must be in writing, and all matters are confidential. Appeal procedures have been established in detail by legislation. The most active area of appeal is against taxes on agricultural land, and many owners are now turning to private firms to prepare appeals on the value of the productivity coefficients estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Other Taxes on Property
There are three additional property-related taxes: the estate tax, the transfer tax, and the gift tax. The value of the base for all three has been specified by a price decree of the Ministry of Finance. When property is transferred, administrators can choose the higher of either the reported sales price or the assessed price as the basis of the tax. Assessment is done by a small corps of fee appraisers, who report their values to the cadastre. The first Sk 500,000 of appraised value is exempt from estate and gift taxes when land is inherited by people under age 18. Inheritance tax rates increase progressively for individuals more distantly related to the decedent who made the bequest. Immediate family members face a rate of up to 5 percent, extended family members are assessed up to 10 percent, and non-relatives may be assessed up to 40 percent. In 1996, these three taxes generated revenue of Sk 896 million (1997 interview with Ministry of Finance official).
Revenues
The property tax yield is low relative to total tax receipts of all levels of government, total tax receipts of local governments, GDP, and other possible measures. Local governments will not gain autonomy and financial self-sufficiency through the current property tax (table 5.5). The current real estate tax does not provide a level of funding that could satisfy the service needs of subnational governments, so municipalities have had to rely on revenue sharing, subsidies from the national government and fees raised locally (table 5.6).
Many local governments have had to resort to selling assets to finance current operations, and some have resorted to deficit finance. The assets in question are mostly housing and businesses transferred to the municipalities from the state that have not been privatized. These properties represent an important asset for the newly enfranchised cities and towns, but they can also represent a burden, because their deteriorated physical state suggests the need for heavy investments that the municipalities can scarcely afford.
The central government could view this situation as a healthy one that motivates the municipalities to promote privatization. Unfortunately, numerous difficulties retard the privatization process. The central government might also consider this asset stock as a reason not to provide revenues for the municipalities to the extent desired. For the next few years, the option of selling assets provides a potential revenue source that partially relieves the central government from the burden of providing for the financial needs of subnational governments.
Current methods of finance do not provide the municipalities with sufficient resources to assure successful fiscal performance. The state, facing financial crises of its own, has tended to reduce the resource flow to the local level. It also appears anxious to transfer to local governments service provision responsibilities that had been managed centrally, such as the school system. The central government is considering the advantages of turning primary and secondary education over to local governments, which makes much sense from the standpoint of local autonomy, but only if the necessary funding is also transferred. The local governments look at their current budgets and have the impression that the tax system, through transfers, subsidies, and local fees, provides nearly enough to meet all their operating responsibilities. If primary and secondary education were to be added to the list, however, it will soon become apparent that local budgets are incapable of providing adequate funding.
General Policy Issues
The fiscal and administrative autonomy of local governments are hallmarks of democracy. Unfortunately, these remain inadequately developed in the Slovak Republic because of the insufficient property tax yield. Moreover, the municipal fiscal system suffers an annual crisis initiated by the central government's budget announcement, which follows an extended period of uncertainty and inability to complete subnational planning processes. A fully functioning property tax would reduce the fiscal dependence of the municipalities on the state and create the greater autonomy advocated by many of Slovakia's political leaders.
Local self-government not only suffers from this lack of fiscal autonomy, but was particularly at risk under the coalition formed by President Mechiar, which pursued a process of recentralization by redesigning privatization procedures to secure personal and political gain. The election of a new regime and the public's later refusal to elect Mechiar as president has given renewed hope to Slovakia's political development.
Equity and efficiency could be enhanced in the property tax system by moving to market valuation of properties. Currently, an attempt to do this is being contemplated by the Ministry of Finance, but these aspirations will continue to be hampered by the lack of market data. Residential rental rates remain under state control, and more than 50 percent of residential properties are owned by the government, although ownership has been transferred from the central government to the municipal level.
In the absence of market data, it would be both possible and advisable to refine the existing valuation process by better accounting for the location and quality of assessed properties. This approach would be unlikely to achieve complete uniformity of assessments, but would be a step in the right direction, also providing substantial additional revenue to the local governments. Increasing rates, coupled with new valuation procedures, would clearly enhance tax yields.
The administration of the property tax is also of great importance. At issue is whether or not the municipalities should continue to collect it. Roughly half of the 2,853 cities and towns have access to computers and only about one-third have full-time administrators. Although considerable efforts are being made to train municipal officers and plans are being considered to increase the number of municipalities authorized to hire full-time workers, local resources are insufficient to administer local fiscal activities effectively. Privatization, especially of specific (for example, technical) tasks also may be a possibility.
Currently, the cadastral system is also a roadblock to the administration of the property tax. During the previous era, the cadastre was rendered nearly inoperable by the communist regime's disregard for private land ownership and the corresponding conviction that the records were of limited value to the state. Efforts are under way to improve the cadastral system, and there are plans to digitize the entire national database.
The functioning of the cadastre also presents an apparent moral dilemma. Because it cannot be monitored by the municipalities, to which it is responsible for the identification of taxable properties, the cadastre has little incentive to rigorously assist the client municipalities that need to make sure taxable properties are identified and on the tax rolls.
In conclusion, Slovakia has struggled with political uncertainty and has experienced privatization captured by opportunistic elements. Given the extant legacies and constraints, it has done about as well with fiscal decentralization as could have been expected. The property tax has not yet played a significant role, but as Slovakia moves from its hasty adaptation of a perceived standard Western taxation system to a more specifically designed system attuned to contemporary fiscal needs, the tax system may well continue to develop in such a manner as to provide independent revenues for local autonomy.
